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Περιεχόμενα

* Introduction
* The Aegean Issues
* Air

* Continental Shelf
* Territorial Sea
* Islands
* Islets
* Dispute Resolution Initiatives
* NATO
* European Union
* Bilateral Diplomacy
* The Madrid Declaration — U.S. Diplomacy
* Motivations for Change
* Greece
* Turkey

* Constraints on Change
* Greece
* Turkey
* U.S. Policy
* Prospects


CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
97-799 F
Greece and Turkey:
Aegean Issues — Background and
Recent Developments
August 21, 1997
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

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Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues — Background and
Recent Developments

Summary
For many years, NATO allies Greece and Turkey have been adversaries in
bilateral disputes which have produced crises and even brought them to the brink of
war. One series of disputes involves Aegean Sea borders. The two disagree over the
border in the air, continental shelf, and territorial sea, over the status of islands in the
Sea, and over the ownership of Aegean islets.

In the aftermath of a January 1996 crisis over the sovereignty of the Imia/Kardak
islet, various dispute resolution initiatives were undertaken. NATO proposed
military-related confidence-building measures, some of which are being
implemented. The President of the European Union Council of Ministers proposed
a committee of wise men, which was accepted in the form of Greek and Turkish
committees of experts who are exchanging views via the President. In March 1996,
Turkey suggested ways to address Aegean issues. A year later, Greece made a
decisive overture that accelerated bilateral diplomacy. Finally, in July 1997, the
United States instigated a joint Greek-Turkish declaration of principles that is said
to equal a non-aggression pact. The principles have yet to be applied to specific
Aegean disputes.

Whether or not Greece and Turkey want to change the nature of their relations
and resolve the Aegean disputes is uncertain. Strong motivations to resolve exist.
Greece wants to meet the criteria for joining the European Monetary Union and must
control defense spending to do so. It can only cut defense spending if the “Turkish
threat” recedes. Greece also wants to cultivate a more positive image in European
circles and its relations with Turkey are an impediment. Turkish secularists want to
be part of Europe and to stop Greek use of the veto in the European Union as a
weapon in bilateral disputes. The influential Turkish military may favor a
rapprochement with Athens. In both countries, however, there may be domestic
political constraints on policy change. In Greece, the legacy of former Prime
Minister Andreas Papandreou, who asserted that Turkey is the greatest threat to
Greece, affects the current government’s maneuverability. In Turkey, nationalist
former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit is now Deputy Prime Minister and the
government’s primary foreign policy spokesman, and there is no new thinking in
Ankara to match that of Athens.

The United States wants stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and, after the
Imia/Kardak crisis, sought to become more active in dispute resolution. U.S.
neutrality in the crisis, however, was perceived in Greece as favoritism toward
Turkey and prevented the United States from engaging immediately. The U.S. desire
to be a force for positive change persevered and reached fruition with the Madrid
declaration in July 1997. The United States is determined to stay on course and work
with the parties to apply the Madrid principles to specific disputes.
The prospects for Aegean resolutions are better now than they have been in
years, but domestic political developments in both Greece and Turkey could affect
the outlook detrimentally.
End of Summary

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